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A.ND WE A.RE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JusTICE. By Derrick A. Bell New York: Basic Books. 1987. Pp. xii,
288. $19.95.

If a book could be said to have a personality, then Derrick Bell's
And We Are Not Saved could certainly be classified as a schizophrenic.
Part fable, part legal scholarship, combining a pessimistic diagnosis of
American race relations and a more optimistic prognosis for the eventual attainment of racial justice, Bell's latest work is simultaneously a
frightening, objective demythologization of American civil rights law,
and a brave and awful personal search "for completeness by allowing a
dialogue with opposites within himself." 1 It is a search that is not
entirely successful but one which yields provocative insights into the
often contradictory thinking of a renowned legal scholar. 2
And We Are Not Saved is an expanded version of the author's foreword to the Harvard Law Review's 1985 Supreme Court issue. 3 There,
Bell, long known as an innovative legal writer, 4 created the character
of Geneva Crenshaw, narrator of the Civil Rights Chronicles and foil
to Bell's rapier-sharp dissection of current civil rights litigation strategies and their prospects for success. Through the telling of her chronicles, Geneva deftly decorticates the layers of myth and fantasy which
envelop American civil rights law and proposes radical alternatives to
traditional litigation strategies, thus allowing Bell to reconstruct the
quest for racial justice from his vantage point as a disappointed and
disillusioned veteran of that long march. Although Geneva eventually
(and unconvincingly) converts to Bell's point of view, it is from the
interplay of her cynical observations and Bell's tempered optimism
that the book derives much of its dynamism.
The book-length version of the Chronicles is divided into three
parts: The Legal Hurdles to Racial Justice, The Social Affliction of
Racism, and Divining a Nation's Salvation. These are further subdivided into ten chronicles addressing the subjects of the constitutional
foundations of racism (in The Chronicle of the Constitutional Contradiction), the limitations of civil rights litigation as a means of obtaining
1. De Gidio, Remarks on the Civil Rights Chronicles, 3 HARV. BLACKLETIER J. 56, 56
(1986).
2. Bell is a professor at the Harvard Law School and former dean and professor at the Uni·
versity of Oregon School of Law. He has served in a number of governmental and public organi·
zations including the United States Department of Justice and the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).
3. Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term - Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV.
L. REv. 4 (1985).
4. See, e.g., Brittain, Book Review, 14 CONN. L. REv. 457 (1982); Freeman, Book Review,
90 YALE L.J. 1880 (1981); Willhelm, Book Review, 79 MICH. L. REV. 847 (1981).
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racial justice (in The Chronicle of the Celestial Curia), the dilution of
black voting power (in The Chronicle of the Ultimate Voting Rights
Act), the fallacy that desegregation promotes educational equality (in
The Chronicle of the Sacrificed Black Schoolchildren), the economic
barriers to racial equality (in The Chronicle of the Black Reparations
Foundation), the dangers of affirmative action (in The Chronicle of the
De Vine Gift), the potential for inter-racial cooperation (in The Chronicle of the Amber Cloud), relations between black men and black
women (in The Chronicle of the Twenty-Seventh-Year Syndrome),
black cultural autonomy and white cultural domination (in The
Chronicle of the Slave Scrolls), and the ultimate emptiness of any racial
reforms which are unaccompanied by fundamental changes in social
and cultural values (in The Chronicle of the Black Crime Cure).
This sprawling, patulous approach to civil rights issues gains thematic strength and coherence from Bell's radicular belief that because
of the inherent limitations of litigation, past attempts to obtain racial
equality have had but limited success and current strategies promise
little more than the alleviation of isolated inequalities, leaving the
overall situation of racial injustice unaltered. 5 Indeed, according to
Bell, many of the solutions sought by civil rights groups exacerbate the
misery of the victims of racial discrimination, rendering them more
vulnerable to the injustices of a racist society.
This viewpoint is most powerfully expressed by Bell in his discussions of school desegregation and affirmative action. 6 Bell has previously7 analyzed and critiqued the litigation strategies leading up to,
and policies flowing from the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.
Board ofEducation. 8 The Chronicle of the Sacrificed Black Schoolchildren, in addition to developing these arguments, is a particularly stirring indictment of school desegregation and a poignant description of
the plight of "invisible" 9 black schoolchildren who, more than a quarter-century after Brown, await, with the "[p]atience ... necessary ...
for those who rely on the law" 10 the harvest of educational equality
allegedly sown by the decision.
School desegregation, argues Bell, must be viewed as just one part
of the civil rights litigation of the 1950s. Schools were seen as "the
weak link in the 'separate but equal' chain" (p. 111). In their determi5. See also Bell, Private Clubs and Public Judges: A Nonsubstantive Debate About Symbols,
59 TEXAS L. REV. 733 (1981).
6. These topics are addressed in chapters 2; 4, and 6.
7. See SHADES OF BROWN, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (D. Bell ed.
1980); Bell, The Dialectics of School Desegregation, 32 ALA. L. REv. 281 (1981); Bell, Brown v.
Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, (Comment), 93 HARV. L. REV. 518
(1980).
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9. P. 110 (citing R. R.Isr, THE INVISIBLE CHILDREN (1978)).
10. Bell, An Issue On Race Relations - Foreword, 61 OR. L. REv. 151 (1982).
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nation to overturn that doctrine as it applied to a broad array of activities, civil rights litigators failed to consider the possibility that equality
in education might best be accomplished through means other than
desegregation. Experience suggests that, rather than depend on social
science data demonstrating the adverse effects of segregation, civil
rights activists should have persuaded the Court that "equal education
in its constitutional dimensions must, at the very least, conform to the
contours of equal education as defined by the educators." 11 A segregated school provided with adequate resources, sympathetic teachers,
and a commitment to preserving and enriching black culture might
better obtain the educational equality sought by Brown. Citing W.E.B.
DuBois, Bell notes, "Other things being equal, the mixed school is the
broader, more natural basis for the education of all youth. . . . But
other things seldom are equal, and in that case, Sympathy, Knowledge, and Truth, outweigh all that the mixed school can offer" (p.
121).
Although Bell does not expressly reject desegregation and racial
balance as appropriate goals for school systems, his description of the
aleatory effects of school desegregation - the closure of black schools,
the firing of black teachers and demotion of black school administrators, the disruption of black student life, and the disappearance of
black community and cultural values which black schools served to
protect (pp. 109-10)- casts into doubt the contention that desegregation is an unalloyedly correct method of rectifying educational inequalities. Moreover, desegregation serves other purposes for white
elites who fear the potential rebelliousness of discontented black
masses (pp. 60-62) and who employ desegregation programs to achieve
their own agendas (pp. 107-11).
Affirmative action programs have similarly resulted in only limited
benefits for blacks, benefits which again accrue to white elites as well.
These programs tend to benefit only a small number of blacks, usually
those with greater degrees of education and skill. Noting William J.
Wilson's argument that "affirmative action programs are not designed
to deal with the problem of the disproportionate concentration of
blacks in the low-wage labor market" (p. 48), Bell contends that affirmative action creates economic schisms within the black community, dilutes the achievements of successful blacks, and denies society's
sympathy to that segment of the black community most deserving of
support (p. 49).
Furthermore, the unspoken limits on affirmative action (i.e., tokenism) create problems not ,amenable to court-ordered remediation.
This is especially true, Bell ironically points out, in just those professional fields where blacks have made their greatest gains. For exam11. P. 110 (quoting Carter, A Reassessment o/Brown v. Board, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW
PERSPECTIVES IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 27 (D. Bell ed. 1980)).
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ple, Bell describes the dilemmas faced by black law professors who see
the rejection of other qualified minorities as silent criticism of their
own performances (p. 148). As token minorities on law school faculties, black professors must confront the possibility that their presence
confers legitimacy and respectability upon racist institutions (p. 146).
Even where they are able to overcome the judicial system's reluctance
to impose affirmative action requirements on elite professions (p. 149),
blacks must fear the gradual attainment of employment levels beyond
the "tipping point," 12 that is, beyond some theoretical point at which
the white institution begins to lose its identity as "white," thus justifying, in the minds of white administrators, purposeful racial discrimination (pp. 151-56).
The limited success of desegregation and affirmative action, as well
as the denial of even the meager benefits of such programs to the black
underclass, is what leads Geneva or, more accurately, Bell to consider
the alternatives to "the leaky boat of litigation" (p. 71). Yet aside
from some casual references to Frances Fox Piven and Richard
Cloward (who believe that mass protest is a better strategy than reform politics for empowering blacks) (p. 58) and an altogether unsatisfying discussion of Marcus Garvey's "back to Africa" movement (p.
187), these alternatives remain largely unexamined. Piven and
Cloward are only two of a significant number of scholars, whose ranks
include Paolo Freire and John Gaventa, 13 who argue that only rebellion can empower the large masses of poor, disenfranchised citizens of
Western and Third World countries. Bell's treatment of these theories
has the quality of a "straw man" argument, superficially presented in
order to assert the ultimate correctness of his own preference for continued litigation. Similarly, Garvey's emigration proposa1s, while
hardly a panacea for American racism, could have been more effectively employed to illustrate the depth of frustration and disillusionment now confronting civil rights activists.
The superficial examination of these alternatives to continued litigation lends Geneva's final conversion to Bell's viewpoint a somewhat
shallow and unconvincing character. The tension between her desire
for violent change and Bell's commitment to legal reform is a simmering conflict which remains unresolved until the final paragraphs of the
book. Then, in a divine revelation which concludes her tales, Geneva
discovers a "Third Way" (p. 251). She accepts that racial equality
must be pursued through the traditional means of litigation but insists
that economic equality be recognized as a concurrently achievable
goal. Just as the civil rights movement has transformed the Constitu12. See also Bell, Application of the "Tipping Point" Principle to Law Faculty Hiring Policies,
10 NOVA L.J. 319 (1986).
13. See, e.g., P. FREIRE, THE PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (1972); J. GAVENTA, POWER
AND POWERLESSNESS (1980).
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tion from a document concerned with property rights into a document
concerned with human rights (p. 252), the "Third Way" must now
force the courts to develop a perspective emphasizing economic as well
as political equality.
Just why the creation of such novel legal rights and remedies will
have greater success than previous attempts to achieve racial justice is
left unclear. But Bell is obviously optimistic. For him, the struggle
against all forms of inequality - racial, sexual, and economic - is a
battle from which "I never will tum back. Oh, I will go. I shall go.
To see what the end will be" (p. 258).
This final outburst of unrestrained optimism stands in dire contrast
to the bleak despair of the titular epigram14 and is but one of the contradictory or ambivalent qualities in Bell's writing. While the use of
Geneva as a noetic antithesis to the author's defense oflitigation serves
to illuminate and enucleate the tensions at the core of Bell's thought,
the dramatized internal dialogue is often distracting. The conversations between Bell and Geneva are frequently strained, the prose often
stilted and unnatural. ts
Moreover, the artificial bifurcation of "Geneva" and "Bell" allows
Bell to enjoy the luxury of not confronting the contradictory arguments in his analyses. It sometimes seems that where those contradictions are hard to resolve, Bell simply has his characters move on to a
new topic of conversation or part company. Bell must have reveled in
this freedom from the rigors of scholasticism, but he has gained that
freedom at a cost to some of his arguments' clarity and cogency.
Finally, the diatribes in which Geneva and Bell engage occasionally do more to obfuscate than to elucidate current judicial policy.
This is especially true in Bell's analysis of voting rights. This complex
area of litigation is not well served by Bell's cursory and dramatized
presentation. Nor do his footnotes sufficiently expand upon the fictionalized material. (In fact, Bell's footnotes are generally too pithy to
be of great value.) It would be interesting and fruitful scholarship
were Bell to bring his considerable analytical skills to bear on this issue in a more rigorous and methodical manner.
Yet, despite these flaws, perhaps because of them, And We Are Not
Saved offers much that is thought-provoking, penetrating, and
profound. Bell's apparent ambivalence towards and qualified acceptance of the wisdom of continued legal reforms represents a deepseated frustration that many civil rights activists must experience in
attempting to push America away from its racist roots and in the direction of a just society. Still, his ultimate faith is that of a man "with
14. Jeremiah 8:20: "The harvest is past, the summer is ended, and we are not saved."
15. Bell himself seems to recognize this. See, e.g., Bell, The Civil Rights Chronicles Revisited:
Comments and Introduction, 3 HARV. BLACKLETI'ER J. 46, 48 (1986) (where Bell describes his
prose as "courageous legalese").

May 1988]

Law and Society

1135

[his] mind set on freedom." 16 Such faith may well prove to be our
nation's salvation.
- Kevin Edward Kennedy

16. Bell, A Hurdle Too High: Class-based Roadblocks to Racial Remediation, 33 BUFFALO
L. REv. 1, 2 (1984).

